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HERE THE BENEFICIARY OF THE WILL WAS IN A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DECEDENT AND THE WILL WAS PREPARED BY AN ATTORNEY ASSOCIATED WITH THE BENEFICIARY; THE UNDUE INFLUENCE OBJECTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Surrogate’s Court, determined the objections to probate of the will alleging undue influence should not have been dismissed. Here the will was prepared by an attorney for a beneficiary of the will:

“Generally, [t]he burden of proving undue influence . . . rests with the party asserting its existence . . . . Where, however, there was a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the beneficiary and the decedent, [a]n inference of undue influence arises which requires the beneficiary to come forward with an explanation of the circumstances of the transaction . . . , i.e., to prove the transaction fair and free from undue influence” … . Here, there are questions of fact whether the will’s sole beneficiary and her husband were in confidential relationships with decedent and, if so, whether the will was free from undue influence, which preclude judgment as a matter of law.

Further, where, as here, “a will has been prepared by an attorney associated with a beneficiary, an explanation is called for, and it is a question of fact . . . as to whether the proffered explanation is adequate” … . Matter of Cher, 2023 NY Slip Op 05062, Fourth Dept 10-6-23

Practice Point: Here issues of fact re: undue influence were raised by the beneficiary’s confidential relationship with the decedent and by association between the beneficiary and the attorney who drafted the will.

 

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