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IN THIS POLICE-CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, THE MUNICIPALITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE POLICE OFFICER’S SPECIFIC CONDUCT WAS EXEMPT FROM THE ORDINARY RULES OF THE ROAD PURSUANT TO VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104, AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE OFFICER WAS NOT LIABLE UNDER THE ORDINARY RULES OF NEGLIGENCE; THE MUNICIPALITY’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant municipality did not demonstrate that the reckless disregard standard applied or that the police officer was not negligent in this police-car traffic accident case:

“[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b)” … . Even where there is no dispute that the driver was involved in an emergency operation of an authorized vehicle, where the injury-causing conduct did not fall within any of the categories of privileged conduct set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), the plaintiff’s claim is governed by principles of ordinary negligence … .

Here, the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether [officer] Giandurco engaged in specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b) and whether the reckless disregard standard of care was therefore applicable … . The defendants also failed to establish, prima facie, that under principles of ordinary negligence, Giandurco was not at fault in the happening of the accident … . Cooney v Port Chester Police Dept., 2022 NY Slip Op 01440, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: Even if a police car is engaged in an emergency operation at the time of a traffic accident, the police officer’s conduct is not automatically judged under the reckless disregard standard for emergency vehicles in Vehicle and Traffic Law 1104. The officer’s specific conduct must fall within one of the the categories of privileged conduct in the statute. Otherwise the ordinary rules of negligence apply. At the summary-judgment stage, a municipality must demonstrate either that the specific conduct was exempt from the ordinary rules of negligence, or that the specific conduct was not culpable under the ordinary rules of negligent. Here the municipality did not demonstrate either one.

 

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