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THE SCHOOL BOARD DID NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN MEETINGS LAW WHEN IT CONSULTED WITH ITS ATTORNEY IN A CLOSED SESSION BEFORE DECIDING NOT TO RENEW PLAINTIFF FOOTBALL COACH’S EMPLOYMENT; THERE IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE OPEN MEETINGS LAW FOR LEGAL ADVICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff high school football coach was not entitled to summary judgment on the cause of action alleging the school board violated the Open Meetings Law by deciding not to renew plaintiff’s employment after a closed meeting. The Open Meetings Law did not apply to the board’s closed-door consultation with its attorney:

It is well settled that “[e]very meeting of a public body shall be open to the general public, except that an executive session of such body may be called and business transacted thereat in accordance with [section 105]” (Public Officers Law § 103 [a] … ). While an executive session may be called to discuss, inter alia, “matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of a particular person” (§ 105 [1] [f]), the public body may do so only upon a majority vote of its membership and after “identifying the general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered” (§ 105 [1]). However, section 108 (3) clarifies that “[n]othing contained in [the Open Meetings Law] shall be construed as extending the provisions hereof to . . . any matter made confidential by federal or state law.” Because “communications made pursuant to an attorney-client relationship are considered confidential under the [CPLR] . . . , communications between a . . . board . . . and its counsel, in which counsel advises the board of the legal issues involved in [a] determination . . . , are exempt from the provisions of the Open Meetings Law” … .

There is no dispute that, during the closed session … , the Board and the District superintendent met with the District’s counsel seeking legal advice “regarding the [p]laintiff’s legal employment status, employment rights, [and] the process for appointing school employees.” We thus agree with defendants that the attorney-client exemption applies and that the court erred in determining that there was a violation of the Open Meetings Law … . Sindoni v Board of Educ. of Skaneateles Cent. Sch. Dist., 2022 NY Slip Op 00772, Fourth Dept 2-4-22

 

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