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DEFENDANT, WHO WAS CONVICTED OF STATUTORY RAPE (NO FORCE) WHEN HE WAS 18 IN 1996, SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED A LEVEL ONE, NOT LEVEL TWO, RISK (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) County Court, determined defendant, who was convicted of statutory rape (no force) in 1996, should have classified as a level one risk, not level two:

Defendant appeals from an order classifying him as a level two sex offender stemming from his 1996 conviction in Virginia for the statutory rape of a 14-year-old female “without the use of force.” Defendant was 18 years old at the time of the offense, which the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders characterized as an “isolated incident.” Defendant successfully completed both sex offender treatment and substance abuse treatment, and he has not been convicted of any other sex crime. Under these circumstances, we agree with defendant, in the exercise of our own discretion, that his presumptive level two classification overestimates his “dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism” … . We therefore modify the order by determining that defendant is a level one risk … . People v Stevens, 2022 NY Slip Op 00581, Fourth Dept 1-28-22

 

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