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THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DID NOT PRECLUDE THIS ACTION TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE PURPORTED 2017 ELECTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS; THE PRIOR ACTION CONCERNED ONLY THE VALIDITY OF THE PURPORTED 2019 ELECTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, held the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude this Sullivan County action, which sought to determine whether a 2017 election of the board of dIrectors of plaintiff religious corporation was valid. A prior action in Kings County determined a 2019 election of the board of directors of the same corporation was a nullity:

As defendants’ amended petition and the order of Supreme Court … in the Kings County proceeding reflect, the issue to be determined therein was the validity of the 2019 election, not the validity of the 2017 election. Defendants sought in that proceeding to declare the 2019 election a nullity and, as a result, enjoin the individual plaintiffs, purportedly elected in 2019, from acting as the board of directors. Indeed, the court went out of its way during oral argument in that matter to so limit the issue when it stated that it “want[ed] to be very clear that [it was] making no determination in this case as to whether [defendants] have any right to control the corporation by virtue of any acts that predated the [June 2019 election.]” The court further clarified “that [it] take[s] no position on the validity of any actions that [defendants] claim[] to have taken in 2017 and thereafter,” and added that the allegations relating to the 2017 election was part of “[t]he Sullivan County matter” which “is not before [it],” and that the proceeding “has nothing to do with the Sullivan County matter.” More importantly, the order signed by the court was so circumscribed, and granted the amended petition “to the sole extent that it [sought] to invalidate” the 2019 election. Congregation Machne Ger v Berliner, 2022 NY Slip Op 00483, Third Dept 1-27-22

 

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