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STATUTE REQUIRING TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ACCIDENT DID NOT REQUIRE NOTICE OF ALL THE INJURIES STEMMING FROM THE ACCIDENT.

The Third Department determined the statute requiring notice of an accident did not require notice of all the injuries. Here the self-insured employer was timely notified of the accident and claimant's knee injury but was not notified of other injuries stemming from the accident until a year later:

Workers' Compensation Law § 18 provides, in relevant part, that written “[n]otice of an injury . . . for which compensation is payable . . . shall be given to the employer within thirty days after the accident causing the injury.” The same provision also provides that the Board may excuse late notice upon certain grounds, including “that the employer, or his or its agents . . . had knowledge of the accident.” Here, the self-insured employer was provided with notice of the accident and claimant's resulting left knee injury within the statutory 30-day period, but was unaware of claimant's other injuries until nearly a year later when she filed her C-3 claim. The self-insured employer contends that this Court should construe the statutory phrase “had knowledge of the accident” to mean “had knowledge of the injury,” and, as a result, conclude that claimant's late notice for the additional injuries is inexcusable pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 18. We reject the self-insured employer's interpretation of Workers' Compensation Law § 18, as it contravenes two foundational rules of statutory construction. Matter of Logan v New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 03776, 3rd Dept 5-12-16

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW (STATUTE REQUIRING TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ACCIDENT DID NOT REQUIRE NOTICE OF ALL THE INJURIES STEMMING FROM THE ACCIDENT)

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