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PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE CONTRACTOR DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER HIRED TO BUILD A NEW STAIRCASE; PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY A PROTRUDING SCREW ON THE NEW STAIRCASE; DEFENDANT WAS NOT LIABLE; THE HOMEOWNER DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION, DID NOT SUPERVISE THE CONTRACTOR’S WORK, AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant homeowner was not liable to plaintiff, an employee of the contractor defendant hired to replace a staircase. Plaintiff was injured by a protruding screw attached to the new staircase:

… [D]efendant established prima facie that he did not create the allegedly unsafe condition in the unfinished staircase … . Although defendant testified that he tried to repair the old staircase before hiring the contractor, the uncontradicted evidence showed that the contractor removed the old staircase and that plaintiff was injured on a screw attached to the new staircase. The new staircase was built entirely by the contractor.

… [P]laintiff’s testimony that defendant gave the contractor instructions on where to place the staircase and general instructions on how he wanted the construction to proceed does not, without more, raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant created the condition. On the contrary, the mere retention of general supervisory powers over an independent contractor, as opposed to the giving of specific directions on how to do the work, cannot form a basis for the imposition of liability against the principal …

There is … no evidence in the record that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition in the unfinished staircase, as the protruding screw was not visible and apparent, nor is there any evidence showing that it existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident to permit defendant to discover and remedy it … . Lara v Kadir, 2022 NY Slip Op 00504, First Dept 1-27-22

 

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