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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S TESTIMONY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ON THE GROUND THE TESTIMONY EXCEEDED THE CPLR 3101 (D) DISCLOSURE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial in this medical malpractice action should have been granted. The trial judge should not have precluded plaintiff’s expert’s testimony on the ground the scope of the testimony exceeded the CPLR 3101 (d) disclosure:

Because portions of the expert’s testimony purportedly fell outside the notice pursuant to CPLR 3101(d), the Supreme Court struck all of this expert’s testimony concerning [defendants] Inglis and Shukla. However, even assuming that portions of the expert’s testimony fell outside the CPLR 3101(d) disclosure, it was error to strike all of his testimony concerning Inglis and Shukla. … [T]o the extent that portions of the expert’s testimony fell outside the CPLR 3101(d) disclosure, the relevant subject matter was raised in the bills of particulars and in the expert’s affirmation submitted in opposition to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Under these circumstances, the court improvidently struck the expert’s testimony concerning the treatment provided by Inglis and Shukla … .

In addition, the Supreme Court sustained objections to questions of the same expert about whether Mosu departed from the accepted standard of care, for a lack of foundation. The court erred in precluding the expert from testifying as to whether Mosu departed from the accepted standard of care since there was a foundation for the expert’s testimony, including the defendants’ and plaintiff’s trial testimony, and the relevant medical records … . Johnson-Hendy v Mosu, 2022 NY Slip Op 00409, Second Dept 1-26-22

 

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