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A SENTENCE CANNOT BE SET ASIDE AS EXCESSIVE PURSUANT TO A CPL 440.20 MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to set aside the sentence should not have been granted. A sentence may not be set aside as excessive pursuant to a Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 440.20 motion:

The defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPL 440.20 to set aside the sentence. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion, and resentenced the … .

To the extent that the Supreme Court set aside the sentence as excessive, such determination was in error, as a “claim that [a] sentence is excessive may not be raised on a CPL 440.20 motion” … .

[T]he defendant did not show that the sentence should be set aside as illegal or unauthorized (see CPL 440.20). The sentence did not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as there existed no exceptional circumstances warranting modification of the terms of imprisonment, which were within the statutory limits … . People v Chambers, 2021 NY Slip Op 07267, Second Dept 12-22-21

 

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