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SILENCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE WAIVER; HERE THE NONPARTY DID NOT EXPRESSLY WAIVE THE COMMON INTEREST, WORK PRODUCT OR TRIAL PREPARATION PRIVILEGES WITH RESPECT TO SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined silence did not constitute waiver of common interest, work product or trial preparation privileges with respect to subpoenaed documents:

“Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right and should not be lightly presumed” … . Accordingly, waiver should not be found absent “evidence from which a clear manifestation of intent . . . to relinquish [the right in question] could be reasonably inferred” … . Waiver “will . . . [not] be implied unless the opposite party is misled to his or her prejudice into the belief that a waiver was intended” … ; hence, a finding of waiver cannot be based upon “mere silence or oversight,” or upon “mistake, negligence or thoughtlessness” … . The burden of proving waiver rests with the party asserting it … . * * *

… [I]t is not alleged that appellant or his counsel expressly orally waived the privilege claims at issue, nor does the record reflect that appellant engaged in any gamesmanship with respect to his privilege claims or that he ever “misled [defendants-respondents] to [their] prejudice into the belief that a waiver was intended” … . Homapour v Harounian, 2021 NY Slip Op 07080, First Dept 12-21-21

 

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