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DEFENDANTS DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO REMOVE PAINT BY SPRAYING LACQUER WHICH APPARENTLY LED TO AN EXPLOSION; THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS SUFFICIENTLY CONTROLLED OR SUPERVISED PLAINTIFF’S WORK SUCH THAT THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION TO A LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT APPLY, AND WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE THEORIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there were questions of fact whether the defendants were entitled to the homeowner’s exemption from Labor Law 241 (6) liability, and whether they sufficiently controlled or supervised plaintiff’s work to be liable under Labor Law 200 or a common-law negligence theory. Plaintiff was injured in an explosion when, at the direction of a defendant, he was spraying lacquer to remove paint. The defendant did not want the plaintiff to sand the paint off, apparently plaintiff’s usual practice, because of the resulting dust:

… [T]he defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they directed or controlled the injury-producing method of work and failed to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to the homeowner exemption of Labor Law § 241(6) … . * * *

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they did not have actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous electrical wiring in the kitchen … , and that they did not direct or control the method and manner in which the plaintiff performed the injury-producing work … . Venter v Cherkasky, 2021 NY Slip Op 07022, Second Dept 12-15-21​

 

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