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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT ACTION ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY THE DEFAULTING DEFENDANT WHO ALLEGEDLY WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE NON-DEFAULTING DEFENDANT, IT WAS AN IMPROVIDENT EXERCISE OF DISCRETION TO DELAY THE DAMAGES ASPECT OF THE SUIT AGAINST THE DEFAULTING DEFENDANT UNTIL THE TRIAL OR DISPOSITION OF THE SUIT AGAINST THE NON-DEFAULTING DEFENDANT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined delaying the damages aspect of the action against a defaulting defendant until the trial or disposition of the action against a non-defaulting defendant was improper under the facts. The Fourth Department noted that it can substitute its discretion for the lower court’s, even where there has been no abuse of discretion by the lower court. The defaulting defendant was an employee of the non-defaulting defendant, YMCA Buffalo Niagara, when he allegedly sexually abused plaintiff. The lawsuit was brought pursuant to the Child Victims Act:

… [Although] a court may, under appropriate circumstances, defer entry of judgment and a determination of damages against a defaulting defendant until resolution of a separately-commenced companion action against non-defaulting defendants, we … agree with plaintiff’s … contention that the court’s decision to do so here constitutes an improvident exercise of its discretion … . We therefore substitute our own discretion “even in the absence of abuse [of discretion]” … .

… [W]e agree with plaintiff that “further delay undermines the purpose of the Child Victims Act, which is to ‘finally allow justice for past and future survivors of child sexual abuse, help the public identify hidden child predators through civil litigation discovery, and shift the significant and lasting costs of child sexual abuse to the responsible parties’ ” … . Given the schedule of the separate action and the accompanying “uncertainty as to when plaintiff’s claims may be resolved against [YMCA Buffalo Niagara], additional delay may hinder [plaintiff’s] efforts to prove damages against defendant and secure a final judgment, particularly considering defendant’s age and the prospect that defendant’s assets may be dissipated in the interim” … . By contrast, we note that the court did not identify any prejudice to YMCA Buffalo Niagara … . “Although judicial economy, which is an important consideration under CPLR 3215 (d) . . . , may favor a single damages proceeding involving both the defaulting and non-defaulting defendants,” we conclude here that “such consideration does not outweigh the significant prejudice that may inure to plaintiff … . LG 46 DOE v Jackson, 2021 NY Slip Op 06507, Fourth Dept 11-19-21

 

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