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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO AN ARMED FELONY, HE WAS AN “ELIGIBLE YOUTH” ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION WHETHER MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED AFFORDING HIM YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s sentence, determined Supreme Court should have found defendant to be an “eligible youth” and then considered whether mitigating circumstances warranted youthful offender status:

While the ultimate determination as to whether an “eligible youth” (CPL 720.20[1]) should be afforded youthful offender status must be made “[a]fter receipt of a written report of the investigation and at the time of pronouncing sentence” … , there is no such requirement with respect to the initial determination as to whether the defendant is an “eligible youth” … .

… Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in finding that the defendant was ineligible for youthful offender status. Pursuant to CPL 720.10(3), although the defendant entered a plea of guilty to an armed felony offense in which he was the sole participant, he could be eligible for youthful offender status if there were “mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed” … . Such mitigating circumstances include “‘a lack of injury to others or evidence that the defendant did not display a weapon during the crime'” … . Here, there is no indication in the record that the defendant displayed the firearm which was recovered from his backpack, that the defendant caused or threatened any injury to another individual, or that the defendant intended to use the firearm against another individual. Consequently, the court should have determined that the defendant is an “eligible youth,” and thus, proceeded to determine whether the defendant is entitled to youthful offender status pursuant to CPL 720.20(1) … . People v Morris, 2021 NY Slip Op 06195, Second Dept 11-10-21

 

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