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PLAINTIFF POLICE OFFICER ALLEGED TWO FELLOW OFFICERS NEGLIGENTLY INJURED HIM WITH A TASER; PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE HIS FELLOW OFFICERS IN TORT AND HIS EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determine plaintiff police officer’s petition for leave to file a late notice of claim should not have been granted and his complaint against two fellow police officers should have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged the two officers negligently tased him. Plaintiff cannot sue the fellow officers in tort, and his exclusive remedy is Workers’ Compensation:

While a police officer can assert a common-law tort cause of action against the general public pursuant to General Obligations Law § 11-106(1), “liability against a fellow officer or employer can only be based on the statutory right of action in General Municipal Law § 205-e” … . General Municipal Law § 205-e(1) specifies that “nothing in this section shall be deemed to expand or restrict any right afforded to or limitation imposed upon an employer, an employee or his or her representative by virtue of any provisions of the workers’ compensation law” … .

Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, “[t]he right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee . . . when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ” … . Thus, the Workers’ Compensation Law “offers the only remedy for injuries caused by [a] coemployee’s negligence” in the course of employment … . “[A] defendant, to have the protection of the exclusivity provision, must himself [or herself] have been acting within the scope of his [or her] employment and not have been engaged in a willful or intentional tort” … . Walsh v Knudsen, 2021 NY Slip Op 05607, Second Dept 10-13-21

 

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SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION.
MOTHER, WHO WAS REPRESENTING HERSELF IN THIS TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS PROCEEDING, WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE JUDGE’S (1) COMMENCING THE HEARING WITHOUT HER, (2) SUBSEQUENTLY EXCLUDING HER FROM THE COURTROOM, (3) DENYING HER REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE IN EVIDENCE, (4) AND DENYING HER REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT TO CONSULT WITH HER LEGAL ADVISOR (SECOND DEPT). ​
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