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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIMS FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined defendant’s (Yeshiva’s) counterclaims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution should have been dismissed:

Supreme Court should have granted those branches of Maspeth’s [the bank’s] motion which were to dismiss Yeshiva’s second and third counterclaims, sounding in abuse of process and malicious prosecution, respectively. To state a cause of action to recover damages for abuse of process, a party must allege the existence of (1) regularly issued process, (2) an intent to do harm without excuse or justification, and (3) the use of process in a perverted manner to obtain a collateral objective … . Here, Yeshiva failed to allege any actual misuse of the process to obtain an end outside its proper scope … . Moreover, “[t]he elements of the tort of malicious prosecution of a civil action are (1) prosecution of a civil action against the plaintiff, (2) by or at the instance of the defendant, (3) without probable cause, (4) with malice, (5) which terminated in favor of the plaintiff, and (6) causing special injury” … . Here, Yeshiva failed to adequately allege malice on the part of Maspeth in commencing the action, a termination of the action in favor of Yeshiva, or the requisite special injury. Maspeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v Elizer, 2021 NY Slip Op 05030, Second Dept 9-22-21

 

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