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ROBBERY FIRST REDUCED TO ROBBERY SECOND BECAUSE A THREAT TO USE A GUN IS NOT “DISPLAY” OF A GUN; “POSSESSION OF A FORGED INSTRUMENT” COUNTS VACATED BECAUSE THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S WALLET WAS IMPROPER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the robbery first conviction must be reduced to robbery second because defendant’s alleged verbal threat to use a gun was not accompanied hand movement or display of a weapon. In addition, the warrantless search of defendant’s wallet was improper and the related “possession of a forged instrument” counts were vacated:

“To sustain a conviction for robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15[4]), ‘[t]he People must show that the defendant consciously displayed something that could reasonably be perceived as a firearm, with the intent of forcibly taking property, and that the victim actually perceived the display'”… . “[I]t is the ‘display’ of what appears to be a firearm, and not the mere threat to use one, which is required” … . “A mere verbal threat is insufficient” as the words must be accompanied by some affirmative action appealing to one or more of the victim’s actual senses … . Here, the witness, whose dry cleaning store had been robbed on an earlier occasion, while testifying that the defendant threatened to use the “gun again,” denied seeing him make any motions with his hands. …

… [D]efendant’s conviction of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree under counts 44 and 45 of the indictment must be vacated. The defendant’s wallet was improperly searched at the time of arrest … , rather than later as part of a “stationhouse inspection of an arrestee’s personal effects” … . People v Costan, 2021 NY Slip Op 04760, Second Dept 8-25-21

 

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