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CPL 450.10 (1), WHICH PURPORTS TO PROHIBIT AN ‘EXCESSIVE SENTENCE’ APPEAL AFTER A GUILTY PLEA, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL, HOWEVER, WAS VALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that Criminal Procedure Law 450.10(1), which purports to prohibit an “excessive sentence” appeal after a guilty plea, is unconstitutional in that it limits the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division, in violation of the NYS Constitution. But the court went on to find that defendant's waiver of appeal was valid and precluded contesting his sentence:

CPL 450.10(1) provides a criminal defendant with the right to appeal a judgment “unless the appeal is based solely upon the ground that a sentence was harsh or excessive when such sentence was predicated upon entry of a plea of guilty and the sentence imposed did not exceed that which was agreed to by the defendant as a condition of the plea.” As the People acknowledge, the Court of Appeals has held that this provision is unconstitutional because “it imposes a limitation or condition on the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division of Supreme Court in contravention of NY Constitution, article VI, § 4(k)” … . * * *

Here, the record of the plea proceeding demonstrates that the defendant understood that the appeal waiver was separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty and that the defendant was voluntarily relinquishing that right in consideration for the promised sentence … . Furthermore, the record of the plea proceeding demonstrates that the defendant received an explanation of the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving that right … . People v Swen, 2018 NY Slip Op 05949, Second Dept 8-29-18

CRIMINAL LAW (CPL 450.10 (1), WHICH PURPORTS TO PROHIBIT AN 'EXCESSIVE SENTENCE' APPEAL AFTER A GUILTY PLEA, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF APPEAL, HOWEVER, WAS VALID (SECOND DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, CPL 450.10 (1), WHICH PURPORTS TO PROHIBIT AN 'EXCESSIVE SENTENCE' APPEAL AFTER A GUILTY PLEA, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF APPEAL, HOWEVER, WAS VALID (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, CPL 450.10 (1), WHICH PURPORTS TO PROHIBIT AN 'EXCESSIVE SENTENCE' APPEAL AFTER A GUILTY PLEA, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF APPEAL, HOWEVER, WAS VALID (SECOND DEPT))/WAIVER OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL LAW, CPL 450.10 (1), WHICH PURPORTS TO PROHIBIT AN 'EXCESSIVE SENTENCE' APPEAL AFTER A GUILTY PLEA, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF APPEAL, HOWEVER, WAS VALID (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING (APPEALS, CPL 450.10 (1), WHICH PURPORTS TO PROHIBIT AN 'EXCESSIVE SENTENCE' APPEAL AFTER A GUILTY PLEA, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF APPEAL, HOWEVER, WAS VALID (SECOND DEPT))

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