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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION THE DEATH OF THE MORTGAGOR/PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT TRIGGER AN AUTOMATIC STAY BECAUSE THE MORTGAGOR/PROPERTY OWNER DIED INTESTATE AND THE ACTION COULD CONTINUE AGAINST THE DISTRIBUTEES WITHOUT THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the death of the mortgagor/property owner in this foreclosure action did not divest the court of jurisdiction because the mortgagor/property owner died intestate and the suit could continue against the distributees without the appointment of a representative:

“Generally, the death of a party divests a court of jurisdiction to act, and automatically stays proceedings in the action pending the substitution of a personal representative for the decedent” … . “In most instances a personal representative appointed by the Surrogate’s Court should be substituted in the action to represent the decedent’s estate”  … . “However, if a party’s death does not affect the merits of a case, there is no need for strict adherence to the requirement that the proceedings be stayed pending substitution” … . “Where a property owner dies intestate, title to real property is automatically vested in his or her distributees” … . Under such circumstances, “a foreclosure action may be commenced directly against the distributees” … . Thus, where a mortgagor/property owner dies intestate and the mortgagee does not seek a deficiency judgment, the mortgagor/property owner’s death “does not affect the merits of a case, [and] there is no need for strict adherence to the requirement that the proceedings be stayed pending substitution” … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Miglio, 2021 NY Slip Op 04780, Second Dept 8-25-21

 

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