You are here: / / FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE...
, ,

FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE CASE BECAUSE THE APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE AN “INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP” WITH THE SUBJECT CHILDREN WITHIN THE MEANING OF FAMILY COURT ACT 812 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction in this family offense case because the appellant did not have an “intimate relationship” with the subject children within the meaning of Family Court Act 812:

The “Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, constrained to exercise only those powers granted to it by the State Constitution or by statute” … . Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812(1), the Family Court’s jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur “between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household” … . “[M]embers of the same family or household” include, among others, “persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time” … . “Expressly excluded from the ambit of ‘intimate relationship’ are ‘casual acquaintance[s]’ and ‘ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts'” … . “Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis, and the factors a court may consider include ‘the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship'” … .

Here, the appellant and the subject children have no direct relationship, and the appellant was only connected to the subject children through her children, who were the half-siblings of three of the subject children. The appellant and the subject children do not reside together and there was no evidence that they have any direct interaction with each other. Accordingly, there is no “intimate relationship” between the appellant and the subject children within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) … . Matter of Watson v Brown, 2024 NY Slip Op 01191, Second Dept 3-6-24

Practice Point: In order for Family Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a family offense proceeding, the respondent must have an “intimate relationship” with the victims within the meaning of Family Court Act 812. The criteria for an “intimate relationship,” which was absent here, are explained in some detail.

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH HARMLESS, IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT THE CONTENT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS WITHOUT AUTHENTICATING THE ACCOUNTS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND STATEMENTS (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS; DEFENDANT AVERRED HIS ATTORNEY DIDN’T REQUEST THE SEARCH WARRANT DOCUMENTS, DIDN’T MAKE A SUPPRESSION MOTION, AND DIDN’T INFORM HIM THAT THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANTS COULD BE CONTESTED (SECOND DEPT).
SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL.
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE WHETHER THE PLYWOOD WHICH FLEXED CAUSING PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS OVER A THREE-FOOT DEEP HOLE OR TRENCH; LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STAYED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 5240 BASED ON COUNTERCLAIMS ASSERTED BY DEFENDANTS, ACTION ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS COULD PROCEED DESPITE ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE DEFENSE DID NOT NEED TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH “EXPERT-OPINION” NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO CALL PLAINTIFF’S TREATING PHYSICIAN TO TESTIFY THAT PLAINTIFF’S COGNITIVE DEFICITS WERE THE RESULT OF A PRIOR STROKE, NOT THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; THE DOCTOR’S TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED AND THE $2,000,000 VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT).
JOINDER OF DEFENDANT AND CO-DEFENDANT FOR TRIAL WAS LAWFUL BUT, BECAUSE OF IRRECONCILABLE DEFENSES, JOINDER RESULTED IN DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
INJURY FROM A FALLING BLOCK AND CHAIN USED TO REPLACE A ROLL UP DOOR WAS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) BUT NOT UNDER LABOR LAW 241 (6) (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE RECORD WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONCLUDE APPELLANT IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING... THE COVID EXECUTIVE ORDERS TOLLING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS EXTENDED THE DEADLINE...