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THE FACT THAT A CONTRACT DESCRIBES A PARTY AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IS NOT NECESSARILY DISPOSITIVE; DESPITE THE WORDING OF THE CONTRACT, THE COMPLAINT HERE STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the complaint stated a cause of action against the school district as the employer of a therapist, Silecchia, who allegedly injured plaintiff-student in therapy session. Although the contract between the school district and Silecchia’s employer, PBS, stated PBS was responsible for the conduct of PBS’s employees, evidence suggested some control over PBS by the district:

Although the agreement provided that all employees of the service provider, which was defined as PBS, shall be deemed as employees of the service provider for all purposes and that the service provider alone would be responsible for their work, personal conduct, direction, and compensation, “[t]he fact that a contract exists designating a person as an independent contractor is to be considered, but is not dispositive” … . Other provisions in the agreement, including the scope of services provision, which provided, … that parent training services shall be in coordination with the students’ classroom teachers and/or at the direction of the District’s Committee on Special Education, provided some indication that the District may have maintained control over the method and means by which PBS, and therefore, Silecchia, were to perform the work … . D. S. v Positive Behavior Support Consulting & Psychological Resources, P.C., 2021 NY Slip Op 04626, Second Dept 8-4-21

 

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