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DEFENDANT TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH PLAINTIFF’S CONTRACT BUT DID NOT TORTIOUSLY INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFF’S BUSINESS RELATIONS OR ENGAGE IN UNFAIR COMPETITION; THE ELEMENTS OF THE THREE CAUSES OF ACTION EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant was properly found to have tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s contract but should not have been found to have tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s business relations or to have engaged in unfair competition. The elements of each cause of action are clearly explained in the decision. With respect to tortious interference with business relations, the court wrote:

“While a cause of action for interference with prospective contract or business relationship is closely akin to one for tortious interference with contract, the former requires proof of more culpable conduct on the part of defendant” … . “This standard is met where the interference with prospective business relations was accomplished by wrongful means or where the offending party acted for the sole purpose of harming the other party” … . “Wrongful means” has been defined to include “physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, and some degrees of economic pressure” … . “[A]s a general rule, the defendant’s conduct must amount to a crime or an independent tort. Conduct that is not criminal or tortious will generally be ‘lawful’ and thus insufficiently ‘culpable’ to create liability for interference with prospective contracts or other nonbinding economic relations” … . In addition, conduct which is motivated by economic self-interest cannot be characterized as solely malicious … . Stuart’s, LLC v Edelman, 2021 NY Slip Op 04569, Second Dept 7-29-21

 

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