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THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH BY THE BANK; THEREFORE THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the criteria for the notice required by RPAPL 1304 in this foreclosure action were not met. The bank’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

RPAPL 1304(1), which applies to residential foreclosure actions, provides, among other things, that, “at least [90] days before a lender, an assignee or a mortgage loan servicer commences legal action against the borrower . . . including mortgage foreclosure, such lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer shall give notice to the borrower.” The version of RPAPL 1304 which existed at the time this action was commenced provided that notices required to be sent pursuant to this section “shall contain a list of at least five housing counseling agencies . . . that serve the region where the borrower resides,” with their “last known addresses and telephone numbers” (RPAPL former 1304[2]).

Here, the RPAPL notices submitted by the plaintiff in support of its motion for summary judgment failed to demonstrate that the notices contained five housing agencies that served the region where the defendant resided. As a result, the plaintiff did not meet its prima facie burden of establishing that it strictly complied with RPAPL 1304 … . US Bank N.A. v Gurung, 2021 NY Slip Op 04387, Second Dept 7-15-21

 

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