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CHARTER SCHOOLS IN NYC ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE RANDOM COVID-19 TESTS TO CITY-RESIDENT CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the NYC Board of Education was required to provide random COVID-19 testing to city-resident students in charter schools, but not to charter-school staff or to nonparty charter schools:

… Supreme Court erred in directing the City to provide Covid testing not only to children but also to charter school staff, and charter schools which are not parties to this proceeding. Section 912 by its terms directs the school district to provide covered services to “resident children who attend” nonpublic schools, to the same extent such services are provided to children attending public schools (Education Law § 912). The statute does not require that such services be provided to staff or anyone else other than resident children. Accordingly, we modify the judgment, to limit relief to children attending petitioners’ charter schools, and not to children attending nonparty charter schools, nor to staff at any school. Matter of King v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 2021 NY Slip Op 04083, First Dept 6-24-21

 

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