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You are here: Home1 / Evidence2 / NO ONE, INCLUDING DEFENDANT DRIVER, SAW THE 17-MONTH-OLD BEFORE HEARING...
Evidence, Negligence

NO ONE, INCLUDING DEFENDANT DRIVER, SAW THE 17-MONTH-OLD BEFORE HEARING A LOUD “THUMP” AND FINDING THE CHILD LYING BEHIND DEFENDANT’S CAR; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant driver did not eliminate all questions of fact about whether she was negligence. Defendant driver heard a loud “thump” and plaintiff’s decedent, a 17-month old child, was found lying on the ground right behind defendant’s car. No one saw the impact:

Shortly before the accident, the driver had dropped off a passenger in a residential cul-de-sac, with several young children playing nearby. After pulling into a driveway and reversing out in the opposite direction, the driver began moving her vehicle forward again when she heard a loud “thump”—which was also heard by at least four other witnesses in the vicinity. Believing that her vehicle had come into contact with a parked car to her right, the driver began reversing her vehicle when a man outside urgently directed her to stop. Upon exiting the vehicle, the driver observed the infant lying on the ground “right behind” her vehicle, on the passenger side. The infant was taken to a hospital, where she died of her injuries the following day. The driver did not see the infant prior to the accident, and the record does not indicate that anyone actually observed the contact between the infant and the defendants’ vehicle. …

Under the circumstances presented, the evidence submitted by the defendants was insufficient to meet their prima facie burden of proof, since it failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact regarding the driver’s alleged negligence, including her ability to see the infant prior to the accident … . Danziger v Elias, 2021 NY Slip Op 04008, Second Dept 6-22-21

 

June 23, 2021
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-06-23 11:30:142021-06-26 13:07:50NO ONE, INCLUDING DEFENDANT DRIVER, SAW THE 17-MONTH-OLD BEFORE HEARING A LOUD “THUMP” AND FINDING THE CHILD LYING BEHIND DEFENDANT’S CAR; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
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