You are here: / / DEFENDANT RADIOLOGIST WAS ASKED TO EVALUATE A MAMMOGRAM AS A ROUTINE-SCREENING...
,

DEFENDANT RADIOLOGIST WAS ASKED TO EVALUATE A MAMMOGRAM AS A ROUTINE-SCREENING PROCEDURE AND, ACCORDING TO HIS EXPERT, DID SO IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACCEPTED PRACTICES; PLAINTIFF WAS DIAGNOSED WITH BREAST CANCER A YEAR LATER; THE RADIOLOGIST’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EXTENSIVE DISSENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the radiologist’s motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice (failure to diagnose) action should have been granted. The radiologist was asked to evaluate a “routine-screening” mammogram and indicated there were no suspicious findings. A year later plaintiff was diagnosed with breast cancer and she died a little more than three years after that. From the radiologist’s perspective, the Second Department concluded, there was nothing to indicate that cancer was suspected and that anything more than a routine-screening was prescribed by plaintiff’s physician:

“Although physicians owe a general duty of care to their patients, that duty may be limited to those medical functions undertaken by the physician and relied on by the patient” … . “The question of whether a physician owes a duty to the plaintiff is a question for the court, and is not an appropriate subject for expert opinion” … .

Here, the radiology defendants established, prima facie, that [defendant] Blumberg discharged his duty to the decedent in accordance with accepted practice for radiologists … . Siegel-Goldman, the radiology defendants’ expert, concluded that Blumberg’s interpretation of the April 21, 2010 mammogram was in conformity with accepted practices. …

… [T}he mere fact that the decedent indicated on the mammography worksheet that she experienced some pain in her left breast did not impose a heightened duty of care on Blumberg, who never saw or treated the decedent, and whose only role was to interpret the mammography images and report his findings to the prescribing physician … . Mann v Okere, 2021 NY Slip Op 04014, Second Dept 6-23-21

 

You might also like
IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE WRONG TYPEFACE IN THE RPAPL 1303 NOTICE REQUIRED DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TO THE EFFECT THE VILLAGE WAS REQUIRED TO REPAIR A BULKHEAD/STORM DRAIN WHICH RAN THROUGH AN EASEMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY; THE WOODEN BULKHEAD WHICH CRADLED THE DRAIN PIPE HAD DETERIORATED CAUSING SINK HOLES (SECOND DEPT).
MOTHER’S MOTION FOR FINDINGS ALLOWING HER CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
“NOTWITHSTANDING” CLAUSE IN THE ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE CONTROLS, THE ADDENDUM REQUIRED THAT THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON THE NOTE START BEFORE THE DATE DESCRIBED IN THE NOTE ITSELF (SECOND DEPT).
A SORA COURT JUDGE HAS THE INHERENT POWER TO, SUA SPONTE, REOPEN A SORA HEARING TO CORRECT AN ERROR (SECOND DEPT). ​
Question of Fact Re: Whether the “Continuous Representation Doctrine” Tolled the Three-Year Statute of Limitations in a Legal Malpractice Action
THE STATEMENT GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT WHEN HE WAS UNDER MEDICATION AT THE HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; AT TRIAL THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REJECT THE STATEMENT IF THEY FOUND IT WAS INVOLUNTARILY MADE; AND THE DEFENSE BATSON CHALLENGE TO THE EXCLUSION OF FOUR AFRICAN-AMERICAN PROSPECTIVE JURORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY AFTER THE UNDERLYING ACTION WAS SETTLED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

NO ONE, INCLUDING DEFENDANT DRIVER, SAW THE 17-MONTH-OLD BEFORE HEARING A LOUD... MURDER SECOND DISMISSED AS INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNT OF MURDER FIRST (SECOND...