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MOTHER BROUGHT A PETITION TO MODIFY CUSTODY AND ALLEGED SHE DID NOT CONSENT TO THE STIPULATION UNDERLYING THE EXISTING CUSTODY ORDER; BECAUSE THE STIPULATION WAS NOT IN THE RECORD AND ITS TERMS WERE NOT IN THE CUSTODY ORDER, A HEARING WAS REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined a hearing was required after mother alleged in her petition to modify custody she did not consent to the stipulation underlying the custody order. The stipulation was not part of the record and the custody order did not recount the terms of the agreement:

Pursuant to CPLR 2104, an agreement between parties is binding against them where, as here, it was reduced to the form of an order and entered. Since “settlement agreements must abide by the principles of contract law, ‘for an enforceable agreement to exist, all material terms must be set forth and there must be a manifestation of mutual assent'” … . CPLR 2104 does not require the parties or the court to place on the record an agreement between the parties that is reduced to an order. However, failing to do so makes the agreement open to collateral litigation … . Here, in light of the mother’s averment that she did not consent to the terms of the custody order, the fact that the terms of the settlement were not placed on the record, and the fact that there was no writing subscribed by the parties, there is an unresolved issue as to whether there was a manifestation of mutual assent to the terms set forth in the custody order. Matter of Izzo v Salzarulo, 2024 NY Slip Op 03751, Second Dept 7-11-24

Practice Point: If a custody order is based upon a stipulation which was not reduced to writing and the terms of the stipulation are not in the order, the order is subject to collateral litigation, here based on mother’s allegation she did not agree to the terms.

 

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