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DECEDENT, WHO DIED TESTATE IN 2004, WAS AWARDED COMPENSATION BY CONGRESS IN 2015 BECAUSE HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN HELD IN IRAN AS A HOSTAGE FROM 1979 TO 1981; BECAUSE THE COMPENSATION WAS AWARDED AFTER HER DEATH, IT DOES NOT PASS BY WILL, BUT RATHER BY THE LAWS OF INTESTACY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, determined the funds awarded by Congress to the decedent, after the decedent’s death, do not pass by decedent’s will, but rather by the laws of intestacy. Decedent, who died in 2004, was the wife of a man held hostage in Iran from 1979 to 1981. In 2015 Congress awarded compensation to the hostages’ families:

Regarding property acquired by an estate after the death of the testator, case law is sparse, but is consistent with the language in EPTL 3-3.1 providing that only property that a testator is entitled to devise “at the time of his [or her] death” may be distributed pursuant to the terms of the will … . We are particularly persuaded by the decision in Shaw Family Archives Ltd. , which involved a dispute over ownership interest in Marilyn Monroe’s right of publicity after her death. The court determined that New York law did not permit a testator to dispose by will of property that she did not own at the time of her death … . The court cited to EPTL 3-3.1 and held that “[t]he corollary principle recognized by the courts is that property not owned by the testator at the time of his [or her] death is not subject to disposition by will” … .

We agree with the reasoning in Shaw Family Archives Ltd. that the New York rule is grounded in the testator’s lack of capacity to devise property he or she does not own at the time of death … . Matter of Keough, 2021 NY Slip Op 03948, Fourth Dept 6-17-21

 

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