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THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMSSED AS TIME-BARRED; RPAPL 1304 IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT, NOT A STATUTORY PROHIBITION WHICH WOULD TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a two-justice partial dissent, determined the defendant’s motion to dismiss the foreclosure action as time-barred, cancel the notice of pendency and cancel and discharge the mortgage (RPAPL article 15) was properly granted. The decision is too complex and factually specific to fairly summarize here (but well worth reading). One of the issues addressed was the difference between a statutory prohibition, which would toll the statute of limitations, and a condition precedent, which would not:

CPLR 204(a) provides that “[w]here the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by a statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not part of the time within which the action must be commenced” … . RPAPL 1304, which the plaintiff argues is a “statutory prohibition,” requires that “at least ninety days before a lender, an assignee or a mortgage loan servicer commences legal action against the borrower . . . , including mortgage foreclosure, such lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer shall give notice to the borrower.” RPAPL 1304 describes the required content and manner of service of the notice. “Strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 notice to the borrower or borrowers is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action” … .

“A statutory prohibition and a condition precedent are separate concepts” … . The salient feature of a “statutory prohibition” is the plaintiff’s lack of control. Since a plaintiff has complete control over the acts necessary to effectuate compliance with a condition precedent, a condition precedent is not a statutory prohibition … . Thus, because the plaintiff had control over when to serve the RPAPL 1304 notice, and could have done so at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, RPAPL 1304 is not a statutory prohibition within the meaning of CPLR 204(a) … . Everhome Mtge. Co. v Aber, 2021 NY Slip Op 03574, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

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