THE DEVELOPMENTALLY-DISABLED PETITIONER HAD THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HER OWN CHOOSING IN THIS PROCEEDING TO DISSOLVE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF HER PERSON (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, considering matters of first impression, determined the developmentally-disabled petitioner had the right to counsel of her own choosing in a proceeding to dissolve the guardianship of her person:

The right of an individual to select counsel “implicates both the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and will not yield unless confronted with some overriding competing public interest” … .

Contrary to the determination of the Surrogate’s Court, the record demonstrates that, under the circumstances present here, the petitioner freely and independently retained counsel of her own choosing. At the hearing, the petitioner articulated her purpose in retaining counsel and demonstrated an understanding of the nature and consequences of having counsel. The record shows, inter alia, that the petitioner had contacted more than one legal organization and spoke personally to the attorney whom she retained, and continued to communicate and work with that attorney. During the court’s inquiry, the petitioner was able to articulate a clear understanding of the purpose and goals of the proceeding and why counsel was sought to be retained. Matter of Jessica L.M. (Deborah M.), 2026 NY Slip Op 06306, Second Dept 10-28-26

Practice Point: Here the developmentally-disabled petitioner had the right to counsel of her own choosing in this dissolution-of-guardianship proceeding.