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KESHA, A RECORDING ARTIST, MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT HER MUSIC PRODUCER, GOTTWALD, HAD DRUGGED AND SEXUALLY ABUSED HER; GOTTWALD WAS PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN HIS DEFAMATION ACTION; GOTTWALD DID NOT HAVE TO PROVE MALICE BECAUSE HE WAS NOT A GENERAL-PURPOSE OR LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE; TWO DISSENTERS DISAGREED (FIRST DEPT).

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff music producer, Gottwald, was entitled to summary judgment on his defamation action against Kesha, a recording artist with whom Gottwald had entered a contract. Gottwald alleged Kesha falsely claimed Gottwald had drugged and sexually abused her in an effort to force Gattwald to release her from the recording contract. The allegations were published in text messages to Lady Gaga and others. The Second Department found that Gottwald was not a general-purpose or a limited-purpose public figure and provided detailed definitions of both. Therefore Gottwald did not have to prove malice on Kesha’s part. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion Gottwald was not a public figure:

A person can only be a general-purpose public figure if “he [or she] is a ‘celebrity’; his [or her] name a ‘household word’ whose ideas and actions the public in fact follows with great interest “and ‘invite[s] attention and comment'” … . * * *

To be considered a limited purpose public figure Gottwald must have: (1) successfully invited public attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident in question, (2) voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the current litigation, (3) assumed a position of prominence in the public controversy, and (4) maintained a regular and continuing access to the media to influence the outcome of the public controversy.

Gottwald cannot be found to be a limited-purpose public figure because he has not done any of these things. Gottwald v Sebert, 2021 NY Slip Op 02456, First Dept 4-22-21

 

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