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PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; THE ROPE AND FRAME USED TO PREVENT A HEAVY OBJECT FROM FALLING WHEN PLAINTIFF DETACHED IT FROM THE WALL DID NOT WORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was struck by a 200 pound fire damper when it fell from the wall. A co-worker was holding a rope tied to the damper and looped over a temporary frame. When plaintiff broke the last weld securing the fire damper the co-worker who was holding the rope was unable to keep the damper from falling:

… [T]he statute is violated where an object, while being hoisted or secured, falls because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute … , including where, as here, the inadequacy or absence of a safety device results in the uncontrolled descent of an object … . Here, plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment because the rope proved inadequate to prevent the damper from falling … .

The eight-foot fall of the 200-pound damper that plaintiff was tasked with removing was not an ordinary construction site peril but an elevation-related hazard, within the ambit of Labor Law § 240(1), which was required to be secured against unregulated descent to prevent it from falling on plaintiff … . Further, regulating its descent to prevent it from falling would not have been contrary to the purpose of work … . Mayorga v 75 Plaza LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01204, First Dept 2-25-21

 

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