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THE HOMEOWNER AND THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY TO BE LIABLE IN THIS LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SCAFFOLD COLLAPSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 200 and negligence causes of action against the homeowners (the Chetrits) and the general contractor (J & S) should have been dismissed in this scaffold-collapse case. Neither defendant had sufficient supervisory authority to trigger liability. Plaintiff worked for a company hired by J & S, the general contractor:

“‘Section 200 of the Labor Law merely codified the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide construction site work[ers] with a safe place to work'” … . “‘To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have authority to exercise supervision and control over the work'” … . Here, both the Chetrits and J & S demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action insofar as asserted against each of them, as the record demonstrates that neither the Chetrits nor J & S supervised, directed, or otherwise controlled the plaintiff’s work … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the fact that Abraham Chetrit, David Chetrit, and J & S’s employees often visited the work site to inspect the work, make requests, and ask questions does not preclude summary judgment, as “‘[m]ere general supervisory authority at [the] work site for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200′” … . Moreover, although J & S employees had the power to stop any unsafe work at the work site, this alone is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 … . Debennedetto v Chetrit, 2021 NY Slip Op 00413, Second Dept 1-27-21

 

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