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THE AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO PROVE DEFENDANTS’ DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WERE NOT BASED UPON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND DID NOT ATTACH THE BUSINESS RECORDS RELIED UPON (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff bank did not submit admissible proof of defendants’ default:

“There is no requirement that a plaintiff in a foreclosure action rely on any particular set of business records to establish a prima facie case, so long as the plaintiff satisfies the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518(a), and the records themselves actually evince the facts for which they are relied upon” … . Here, neither Joanne Orelli, a senior vice president of Flushing Bank, who verified the complaint, nor Mark Levin, the managing member of the plaintiff, who submitted an affidavit in support of the motion, stated that they had personal knowledge of the default. Moreover, to the extent their knowledge was based on their review of business records, they did not identify what records they relied on and did not attach them to the verified complaint or the affidavit … . Flatbush Two, LLC v Morales, 2021 NY Slip Op 00294, Second Dept 1-20-21

 

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ALTHOUGH THE VILLAGE CODE MADE THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING... THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED UPON BUSINESS...