You are here: / / THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED; THE DISCONTINUANCE DID NOT DE-ACCELERATE...
,

THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED; THE DISCONTINUANCE DID NOT DE-ACCELERATE THE DEBT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should have been granted. The action was time-barred. The debt was accelerated when the foreclosure action was started and the discontinuance did not de-accelerate the debt:

Plaintiff’s … contention—that the stipulation of discontinuance in the 2007 action revoked the acceleration of the debt—is likewise without merit. … Here, the stipulation of discontinuance in the 2007 action is silent on the issue of the revocation of the election to accelerate and does not otherwise indicate that the plaintiff would accept installment payments from the defendant and thus did not constitute an affirmative act revoking acceleration … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Ebanks, 2020 NY Slip Op 08035, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

You might also like
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER, ANSWERING A CALL, ACTED RECKLESSLY IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).
FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY QUESTION JUROR ABOUT HER ABILITY TO BE FAIR AFTER SHE INDICATED SHE DID NOT THINK A PERSON SHOULD RESPOND TO VIOLENCE WITH VIOLENCE REQUIRED REVERSAL (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON WHETHER COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INFORM HIM OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILITY PLEA AND FOR FAILING TO NEGOTIATE A PLEA TO AN OFFENSE WHICH DID NOT MANDATE DEPORTATION (SECOND DEPT).
PETITIONER DEMONSTRATED A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO TIMELY FILE AND SERVE HIS OPPOSITION PAPERS AND DEMONSTRATED A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS CAUSE OF ACTION; SUPREME COURT HAD REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE OPPOSITION PAPERS BEFORE ISSUING ITS ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION; THE ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT).
Gifts from One Spouse to the Other Are Marital Property Subject to Equitable Distribution
THE EXTENSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CPLR 213-B(1) WHICH ALLOWS A VICTIM OF A CRIME TO SUE THE PERPETRATOR WITHIN SEVEN YEARS OF THE DATE OF CRIME APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE PERPETRATOR HAS BEEN “CONVICTED OF [THE] CRIME;” A PERPETRATOR WHO HAS BEEN ADJUDICATED A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER HAS NOT BEEN “CONVICTED OF A CRIME” WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 213-B(1) (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence of Constructive Possession of Contraband Insufficient, Convictions Reversed
COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED AN ACCOUNTING BEFORE DETERMINING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, NEITHER PARTY REQUESTED AN ACCOUNTING (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DEMONSTRATED THERE HAD BEEN NO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ON... A CONTRACTOR ALLEGED TO HAVE WORKED ON THE AREA OF THE ROADWAY WHERE PLAINTIFF...