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THE WRONGFUL DEATH COMPLAINT ALLEGED PORT AUTHORITY WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO INSTALL SUICIDE-PREVENTION BARRIERS ON THE GEORGE WASHINGTON BRIDGE; THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the complaint alleging the Port Authority was negligent for failure to install suicide-prevention barriers on the George Washington Bridge should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s decedent had jumped off the bridge. Supreme Court held the maintenance of the bridge was a governmental function and there was no special relationship between Port Authority and plaintiff’s decedent. The Second Department held the complaint alleged Port Authority was acting in a proprietary capacity and therefore was subject to ordinary principles of negligence:

… [T]he complaint did not need to allege that the Port Authority owed a special duty to the decedent, as opposed to the public generally, as the Port Authority did not establish that it was acting in a governmental capacity in maintaining the bridge … . Since the complaint has alleged facts that support a determination that the Port Authority was acting in a proprietary capacity, the Port Authority would be subject to the same principles of tort law as a private landowner, and as such, the complaint states a cause of action … . Here, accepting all facts alleged in the complaint as true for the purposes of this motion, the Port Authority’s remaining contentions likewise do not establish that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Perlov v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2020 NY Slip Op 08092, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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