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THE REAL PROPERTY PASSED TO THE BENEFICIARY IN THE WILL UPON DEATH, NOT UPON SUBSEQUENT PROBATE; THEREFORE THE CONVEYANCE WAS VALID AND THE DEED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED VOID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined plaintiff’s deed inherited the real property upon decedent’s death, not after probate. Therefore the conveyance of the property by the beneficiary, McKenzie, to plaintiff was valid:

… [T]he decedent’s will, unequivocally and without limitation, devised McKenzie one third of the residuary estate, and this interest vested in McKenzie at the moment of the decedent’s death … . Although the vesting of McKenzie’s interest was “subject to the executor[‘s] duty to ensure that all debts and obligations of the estate[ ] were met” … , the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that McKenzie’s conveyance of her interest impeded the executor’s duties, and thus, failed to establish, prima facie, that McKenzie’s interest had not yet vested when she conveyed it to the plaintiff after the decedent’s death … .  72634552 Corp. v Okon, 2020 NY Slip Op 07845, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

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