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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, INCREASED A PENALTY TO WHICH THE PARTIES HAD AGREED IN A SO-ORDERED STIPULATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge, sua sponte, should not have increased a penalty to which the parties had stipulated:

“A so-ordered stipulation is a contract between the parties thereto and as such, is binding on them and will be construed in accordance with contract principles and the parties’ intent” … . “When an agreement between parties is clear and unambiguous on its face, it will be enforced according to its terms and without resort to extrinsic evidence” … . Accordingly, a court “should not, under the guise of contract interpretation, ‘imply a term which the parties themselves failed to insert’ or otherwise rewrite the contract” … .

Here, we disagree with the Supreme Court’s sua sponte determination to change the $1,000 per week penalty set forth in the 2013 stipulation … . Although the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law authorizes a penalty of up to $5,000 per day … ,  the parties expressly agreed to a different penalty in their 2013 stipulation. Thus, the court should not have “rewritten” the terms of the 2013 stipulation by changing the amount of the penalty agreed to by the parties. City of New York v Quadrozzi, 2020 NY Slip Op 07856, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

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