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THE BANKS’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted because compliance with the notice requirements of RPAP 1304 was not demonstrated with admissible evidence:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted, inter alia, an affidavit of a business operations analyst employed by the plaintiff, together with copies of 90-day notices sent to the defendants and proof of filing statements from the New York State Department of Financial Services. Although some of the copies of the 90-day notices contain what appear to be bar codes with 22-digit numbers that include the words “USPS CERTIFIED MAIL,” the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence that the mailings were sent by first-class mail in addition to certified mail … . The plaintiff also failed to submit evidence of a standard office mailing procedure or an affidavit of the individual(s) who effected the service … . The submission by the plaintiff of evidence that it filed statements with the New York State Department of Financial Services, without more, is insufficient to establish that the mailing was accomplished pursuant to RPAPL 1304 … . CitiMortgage, Inc. v McGregor, 2020 NY Slip Op 07855, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

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