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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / THE PROPERTY TRANSFERRED TO THE DEFENDANT BY WILL UPON THE DEATH OF THE...
Civil Procedure, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Trusts and Estates

THE PROPERTY TRANSFERRED TO THE DEFENDANT BY WILL UPON THE DEATH OF THE PROPERTY OWNER; THEREFORE THE ESTATE WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the estate was not a necessary party in this foreclosure action because the property transferred upon the property owner’s death by operation of the will:

Pursuant to a deed dated March 27, 1991, Marjorie Colwell became the owner of certain real property located in Brooklyn (hereinafter the subject property). Colwell died on November 8, 2004. Colwell’s will bequeathed the subject property to the defendant Sonia Gaines, and also named Gaines as the executrix of the estate. …

We disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the estate was a necessary party to this action, and that the failure to join the estate warranted vacatur of the order of reference and the judgment of foreclosure and sale and dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against Gaines … . Pursuant to RPAPL 1311(1), “necessary defendants” in a mortgage foreclosure action include, among others, “[e]very person having an estate or interest in possession, or otherwise, in the property as tenant in fee, for life, by the curtesy, or for years, and every person entitled to the reversion, remainder, or inheritance of the real property, or of any interest therein or undivided share thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein.” Under the circumstances of this case, the estate was not a necessary party to this mortgage foreclosure action. “Generally, title to real property devised under the will of a decedent vests in the beneficiary at the moment of the testator’s death and not at the time of probate” … . US Bank Trust, N.A. v Gaines,2020 NY Slip Op 07623, Second Dept 12-16-20

 

December 16, 2020
Tags: Second Department
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