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THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYEE WAS ON HIS WAY HOME FROM A CORPORATE MEETING HELD BY HIS EMPLOYER WHEN THE CAR ACCIDENT HAPPENED; THE EMPLOYER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined defendant driver, Brownlee, was not acting within the scope of his employment, when the car accident occurred. Brownlee was on his way home from a meeting held by his employer, Stellar:

… [I]t is undisputed that the collision occurred while Brownlee was driving home from a corporate meeting held by Stellar at its headquarters in Canada. Evidence submitted by Stellar on its motion established that the corporate meeting had ended and that Brownlee had been released for the day at the time of the collision. Although Brownlee testified at his deposition that he believed that he had intended to stop at Stellar’s facility in Pennsylvania before returning home, once he received permission to leave the corporate meeting, he was no longer acting in furtherance of any duty that he owed to Stellar and was no longer under Stellar’s control … . Indeed, Brownlee did not testify that Stellar had directed him to stop at the Pennsylvania facility or that Stellar had ordered him to perform any other act once the meeting had ended. The fact that the corporate meeting was held at a location other than Brownlee’s typical place of work does not alter our analysis, nor does the fact that Brownlee was reimbursed for travel expenses … . Wood v Brownlee, 2020 NY Slip Op 06887, Fourth Dept 11-20-20

 

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