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PLAINTIFF BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR; DESPITE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MOTION, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, SUA SPONTE, PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint in this foreclosure action should not have been, sua sponte, dismissed for failure to take steps to procure a default judgment within one year. Plaintiff moved for an order of reference within one year. It doesn’t matter that the motion was withdrawn:

Pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after [a] default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” It is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year of the default in order to avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c)  … . “Rather, it is enough that the plaintiff timely takes ‘the preliminary step toward obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale by moving for an order of reference’ to establish that it ‘initiated proceedings for entry of a judgment within one year of the default,’ for the purposes of satisfying CPLR 3215(c)” … .

Here, the plaintiff took the preliminary step toward obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale by moving for an order of reference in May 2010, within one year of the defendants’ default … . In such cases, the complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), even if, as here, the plaintiff’s motion is later withdrawn … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Hasan, 2020 NY Slip Op 06243, 11-4-20

 

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