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THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT WAS HEARSAY, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. The proof of defendant’s default was hearsay:

For evidence of default, the plaintiff relied upon the affidavit of a foreclosure manager employed by the plaintiff, wherein she attested, among other things, that the defendant defaulted under the loan in February 2011. By attesting that she was familiar with the record-making practices of her employer, that the records were made in the regular course of business, that it was the regular course of such business to make the record, and that the records were made “at or about the time of the event being recorded” … , the foreclosure manager satisfied the requirements for establishing a foundation for the admission of business records (see CPLR 4518[a] …). However, since the foreclosure manager failed to submit any of the business records upon which she contends she relied in making her affidavit, her averment as to the defendant’s purported default “‘constitute[s] inadmissible hearsay and lack[s] probative value'” … . As “it is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, [*2]that serves as proof of the matter asserted” … , and “a witness’s description of a document not admitted into evidence is hearsay” … , the assertions by the foreclosure manager as to the contents of the records were “inadmissible hearsay to the extent that the records she purport[ed] to describe were not submitted with her affidavit” … . Selene Fin., L.P. v Coleman, 2020 NY Slip Op 05962, Second Dept 10-21-20

 

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