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NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined New York does not recognize a cause of action for sexual harassment:

… New York does not recognize an independent, common-law cause of action to recover damages for sexual harassment … . Rather, allegations of sexual harassment—which typically arise in the context of an asserted violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Law of 1964 (42 USC, ch 21, § 2000e et seq.), the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), and/or the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107)—may form the basis of cognizable common-law tort theories such as, inter alia, assault and battery, negligent training and supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress … .

Accordingly, the Court of Claims should have granted that branch of the State’s cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss so much of the claim as was predicated upon a purported common-law cause of action to recover damages for sexual harassment. Budha T. v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 05966, Second Dept 10-21-20

 

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THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT WAS HEARSAY, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION... THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE WHETHER THE DEFENDANT REVIEWED THE VERDICT SHEET...