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CO-DEFENDANT’S REDACTED STATEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED IN EVIDENCE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the co-defendant’s redacted admission should not have been admitted in evidence:

… [W]e agree with the defendant that, under the instant circumstances, the Supreme Court’s admission of codefendant Jason Villanueva’s redacted statement to the police violated the rule articulated in Bruton v United States (391 US 123), because the subject redaction would have caused the jurors to “realize that the confession refers specifically to the defendant” or to one of the other nonconfessing codefendants … . In addition, the error was not harmless. “[I]t cannot be said that ‘there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted [statement] contributed to the conviction'” … , given that the statement was inconsistent with the defendant’s justification defense, and the court failed to give the jurors a proper limiting instruction to only consider the statement against Villanueva. People v Casares, 2020 NY Slip Op 05520, Second Dept 10-7-20

 

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NATURE OF AN INGRESS AND EGRESS EASEMENT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE WAS DEEMED LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS...