You are here: / / NASSAU COUNTY SUPREME COURT CANNOT VACATE A DEFAULT ORDER ISSUED BY NEW...

NASSAU COUNTY SUPREME COURT CANNOT VACATE A DEFAULT ORDER ISSUED BY NEW YORK COUNTY SUPREME COURT, DESPITE THE CHANGE OF VENUE FROM NEW YORK COUNTY TO NASSAU COUNTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Nassau County Supreme Court could not vacate the default order issued by New York County Supreme Court, even though New York County Supreme Court had granted a change of venue to Nassau County:

The Supreme Court, Nassau County, had no authority to vacate the order of the Supreme Court, New York County … . A motion to vacate an order must be addressed to the court that made the order (see CPLR 5015[a]), and no court other than the one that rendered the order may entertain a motion to vacate it … . In any event, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court, New York County, did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to issue the New York County default order one day after its order granting a change of venue to Nassau County, since the “Supreme Court is a court possessing State-wide jurisdiction and is competent to entertain a motion no matter where the underlying action is pending” … . London v 107 (160) Realty, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05195, Second Dept 9-30-20

 

You might also like
LAW REGARDING SALE OF PROPERTY OWNED BY TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY WHERE ONLY ONE SPOUSE SIGNS THE CONTRACT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE DEFENDANT DEVELOPED THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPLAINANT FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF VICTIMIZING HER AND THEREFORE 20 POINTS WERE PROPERLY ASSESSED UNDER RISK FACTOR 7; THE COMPREHENSIVE DISSENT ARGUED THERE WAS A PRE-EXISTING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPLAINANT WHICH RENDERD RISK FACTOR 7 INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING IN COOK (SECOND DEPT).
​ ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE COMMITED DEFENDANT TO SIX MONTHS IN A SECURE FACILITY PURSUANT TO CPL 330.20(6) WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE REPRESENTATION THAT THE INSURED PROPERTY WAS A TWO-FAMILY DWELLING WHEN, IN FACT, IT WAS A THREE-FAMILY DWELLING, WAS A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION; COVERAGE FOR FIRE DAMAGE PROPERLY DISCLAIMED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF’S FAVOR, PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED A POLICE REPORT WHICH RAISED THE QUESTIONS OF FACT, BY SUBMITTING THE REPORT PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY OBJECTIONS TO INADMISSIBLE STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN IT (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS A CO-PILOT OF A HELICOPTER USED TO PROVIDE AN AERIAL PLATFORM FOR WORK ON POWER LINES; THE HELICOPTER STRUCK A POWER LINE AND PLAINTIFF JUMPED FROM THE HELICOPTER FROM A HEIGHT OF 75 FEET; THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) STRICT LIABILITY CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT (FAA); THE LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; RATHER THE FEDERAL STANDARD OF CARE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE CITY HAD CLEARED A PATH FREE OF ICE AND SNOW ON THE SIDEWALK; PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL WHEN SHE STEPPED BACKWARDS INTO AN AREA OF THE SIDEWALK WHICH HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED TO AVOID AN UNLEASHED DOG; THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THEY WERE OVERWHELMED BY THE DOCUMENTS THEY SIGNED AND DID NOT REALIZE THE DOCUMENTS TRANSFERRED THEIR PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT; THOSE ALLEGATIONS DID NOT SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFFS’ FAVOR ON THEIR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND QUIET TITLE CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

LOST NOTE AFFIDAVIT INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH STANDING; PROOF OF COMPLIANCE... SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THE PROVISION OF AN “AGREEMENT...