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NASSAU COUNTY SUPREME COURT CANNOT VACATE A DEFAULT ORDER ISSUED BY NEW YORK COUNTY SUPREME COURT, DESPITE THE CHANGE OF VENUE FROM NEW YORK COUNTY TO NASSAU COUNTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Nassau County Supreme Court could not vacate the default order issued by New York County Supreme Court, even though New York County Supreme Court had granted a change of venue to Nassau County:

The Supreme Court, Nassau County, had no authority to vacate the order of the Supreme Court, New York County … . A motion to vacate an order must be addressed to the court that made the order (see CPLR 5015[a]), and no court other than the one that rendered the order may entertain a motion to vacate it … . In any event, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court, New York County, did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to issue the New York County default order one day after its order granting a change of venue to Nassau County, since the “Supreme Court is a court possessing State-wide jurisdiction and is competent to entertain a motion no matter where the underlying action is pending” … . London v 107 (160) Realty, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05195, Second Dept 9-30-20

 

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