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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ON THE GROUND THE PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO RENDER AN OPINION; ANY WEAKNESSES IN THE EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT WENT TO ITS WEIGHT NOT ITS ADMISSIBILITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this dental malpractice action should not have been dismissed. The weaknesses in plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit went to the weight of her opinion as evidence, not its admissibility:

The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion, determining that the defendant demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the dental malpractice cause of action insofar as asserted against him, and that the expert affirmation submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition lacked probative value because the plaintiffs’ expert was not qualified to render an opinion as to the applicable standard of care. …

… [T]he affirmation of the plaintiffs’ expert was sufficient to demonstrate his qualifications to render opinions as to the applicable standard of care and, under these circumstances, raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant deviated from that standard and whether any such deviation was a proximate cause of [plaintiff’s] injuries … . “Any lack of skill or expertise that the plaintiff’s expert may have had goes to the weight of his or her opinion as evidence, not its admissibility” … . The parties’ conflicting expert opinions raised questions of credibility for the trier of fact … . Lesniak v Huang, 2020 NY Slip Op 05044, Second Dept 9-23-20

 

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