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COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WITHOUT ALLOWING THE AFFECTED PARTY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the judge should not have ordered the payment of attorney’s fees for frivolous conduct without allowing the affected party to be heard on the question:

“The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, . . . costs in the form of reimbursement for . . . reasonable attorney’s fees, resulting from frivolous conduct” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a]). An award of costs or the imposition of sanctions “may be made either upon motion in compliance with CPLR 2214 or 2215 or upon the court’s own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to be heard” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[d]). Here, the respondents did not cross-move for costs or sanctions in compliance with CPLR 2215, the respondents’ opposition to the petitioner’s motion for leave to renew did not clearly articulate a request for costs or sanctions, and there is no indication in this record that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard on this issue … . Accordingly, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding costs to the respondents in the form of attorneys’ fees in the sum of $2,500 … . Matter of Garvey v Sullivan, 2018 NY Slip Op 07724, Second Dept 11-14-18

JUDGES (FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT, SANCTIONS, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WITHOUT ALLOWING THE AFFECTED PARTY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (SANCTIONS, ATTORNEY’S FEES, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WITHOUT ALLOWING THE AFFECTED PARTY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT))/FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT (ATTORNEYS, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WITHOUT ALLOWING THE AFFECTED PARTY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT))/SANCTIONS (FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WITHOUT ALLOWING THE AFFECTED PARTY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ATTORNEYS, FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT, SANCTIONS, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WITHOUT ALLOWING THE AFFECTED PARTY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 2214, 2215 (ATTORNEYS, FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT, SANCTIONS, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WITHOUT ALLOWING THE AFFECTED PARTY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT))/SUA SPONTE (FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT, SANCTIONS, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WITHOUT ALLOWING THE AFFECTED PARTY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT))

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