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AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY AN INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT BE BROUGHT AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant city’s motion for summary judgment in this false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, civil rights violation, negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress action should have been granted, in large part because there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest. The court noted that an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action cannot be brought against a municipality:

… [T]he defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, since “[i]t is well settled that public policy bars claims sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress against a governmental entity” … . Rapuzzi v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 05067, Second Dept 9-23-30

 

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