ALTHOUGH THE MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED FOR THE MOVING DEFENDANT, THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, GRANTED THE SAME RELIEF TO DEFENDANTS WHO DID NOT SO MOVE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that the judge should not have, sua sponte, vacated the judgment of foreclosure as against those defendants who did not move for that relief:

“A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal” … . “[T]he defense of lack of jurisdiction based on improper service is personal in nature and may only be raised by the party improperly served'” … . Here, Hickson was the only defendant who moved to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale and to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court had no basis to, sua sponte, vacate so much of the judgment of foreclosure and sale as was against the defendants other than Hickson and to direct the dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against those defendants for lack personal jurisdiction. Lehman Bros. Bank v Hickson, 2020 NY Slip Op 04932, Second Dept 9-16-20