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THE JUDGE DID NOT PRONOUNCE THE LENGTH OF THE TERM OF PROBATION, SENTENCE VACATED AND MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s sentence, determined the judge’s failure to pronounce the term of probation required remittal:

CPL 380.20 requires that courts “must pronounce sentence in every case where a conviction is entered.” “When the sentencing court fails to orally pronounce a component of the sentence, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remitted for resentencing in compliance with the statutory scheme” … . Here, although the parties do not dispute that, as part of the negotiated disposition, the defendant was promised a term of probation of three years, the sentence must be vacated and the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentencing because the court failed to pronounce the length of the probation term … . People v Childs, 2020 NY Slip Op 04404, Second Dept 8-5-20

 

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ALTHOUGH THE TENANT HAD VIOLATED CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE, THE EVICTION... BY ENTERING A PLEA AGREEMENT WITH A TESTIFYING CODEFENDANT THE TRIAL JUDGE ABANDONED...